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Abstract
In 2002, Norway experienced a large outbreak of Pseudomonas aeruginosa infections in hospitals
with 231 confirmed cases. This fuelled intense public and professional debates on what were the
causes and who were responsible. In epidemiology, other sciences, in philosophy and in law there
is a long tradition of discussing the concept of causality. We use this outbreak as a case; apply
various theories of causality from different disciplines to discuss the roles and responsibilities of
some of the parties involved. Mackie's concept of INUS conditions, Hill's nine viewpoints to study
association for claiming causation, deterministic and probabilistic ways of reasoning, all shed light
on the issues of causality in this outbreak. Moreover, applying legal theories of causation
(counterfactual reasoning and the "but-for" test and the NESS test) proved especially useful, but
the case also illustrated the weaknesses of the various theories of causation.
We conclude that many factors contributed to causing the outbreak, but that contamination of a
medical device in the production facility was the major necessary condition. The reuse of the
medical device in hospitals contributed primarily to the size of the outbreak. The unintended error
by its producer – and to a minor extent by the hospital practice – was mainly due to non-application
of relevant knowledge and skills, and appears to constitute professional negligence. Due to criminal
procedure laws and other factors outside the discourse of causality, no one was criminally charged
for the outbreak which caused much suffering and shortening the life of at least 34 people.
Introduction
In 2002, we traced the source of a large outbreak of Pseu-
domonas aeruginosa infections to contaminated mouth
swabs extensively used in Norwegian health care [1]. The
investigation revealed many weaknesses and errors in the
chain from production to use [2].
During and after the outbreak investigation, questions of
causality, responsibility and liability were raised: Who
and what caused the outbreak, who were responsible for
the extent of the outbreak, could the damages have been
mitigated by acting sooner or differently, should anyone
be punished? Questions of causality, responsibility and
blame have always been a part of the history of infections.
Two examples are the debate on where the Spanish flu
came from and who was responsible for starting the Aids
epidemic.
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The concept of causality is intuitively simple and yet so
intricately complex. In epidemiology causality has been
hotly debated [3-11]. In philosophy of science there is a
long tradition of discussing both the content of the term
and how to achieve knowledge about the association of
events [12]. In law, decisions on responsibility and liabil-
ity rests on whether a specific action has caused specific
harm or loss to another, and jurisprudence frequently
defers to science in order to settle issues of causality [13-
16]. However, not only is the discourse of causality in the
philosophy of science interesting for law, reciprocally the
debate on legal causation, especially in tort law, is useful
for the scientists and the philosophers of science. In all
these three disciplines (science, philosophy and law) and
in practical life this discourse has implications for placing
moral responsibility, blame, honour and dishonour. Con-
sequently the general debate on causality is of interest
both for scientists, manufacturers, and lawyers, as for the
general public because it influences moral as well as pro-
fessional norms.
In this article, we will use the outbreak of P. aeruginosa
infections to illustrate the relevance of various theories of
causality and discuss the role of the different participants.
Then we will discuss the responsibility and fallibility for
two of the main actors in the outbreak.
Setting the scene
Late February 2002, the Norwegian Institute of Public
Health (NIPH) was alerted of a possible increase in the
number of Pseudomonas  infections in clinical wards of
Norwegian hospitals [1]. After a strenuous outbreak inves-
tigation, on 8 April 2002, the outbreak strain was isolated
from a domestically produced mouth swab for use in
health care, called "Dent-O-Sept" (figure 1). The finding
was publicised, the product was recalled, and the produc-
tion ceased permanently.
The outbreak strain was detected in swabs from 12
batches produced in 2001 and 2002 [2] and from the pro-
duction line in the factory. An audit of the producer
revealed several breaches of production regulations [17].
Health care institutions reported some extent of non-
proper reuse of the swabs and weaknesses in their pur-
chasing systems.
The strain was detected in 231 patients from 24 hospitals,
of whom 71 (31%) died while hospitalised; all had severe
underlying disease. For at least 34 patients the investiga-
tors concluded that the P. aeruginosa infection probably
contributed to the patient's death [1]. No one was found
criminally liable for the outbreak.
Two of the authors (BGI and PA) were responsible for the
outbreak investigation at the Norwegian Institute of Pub-
lic Health [1,2]. After six years have passed we feel that we
can give a balanced review of the causes of the outbreak
but will abstain from evaluating our role in it.
So, what was the cause of the outbreak, and who were
responsible? Let us first examine the issues of causation
from a scientific point of view, and then relate them to the
legal issues of responsibility and liability.
Analysis
Before presenting theories on causality, responsibility and
liability we need to define what was caused, i.e. what was
the epidemiological outcome. We have asked "what
caused the outbreak", but "the outbreak" is a rather dif-
fuse concept and consists of the sum of individuals who
each had their own set of factors contributing to them
being included. Although the attention was brought to the
individual cases by clinical manifestations (infections),
we included in the outbreak all patients with genotypi-
cally identical strains of P. aeruginosa, irrespective of sur-
vival or severity of disease [1]. For this analysis we will
make it clear which of the four different outcomes we
have in mind; 1. being a case as defined in the outbreak
investigation, 2. having a P. aeruginosa infection, irrespec-
tive of type of strain, 3. dying from P. aeruginosa infection
or 4. the outbreak as a whole.
Causality
We often say that one thing causes another, like "rain
causes flooding" and "smoking causes cancer", although it
is not always true. We don't have a flood every time it is
raining, and flooding can have other reasons than rain: a
broken water pipe for example.
The philosophical basis of the dominant approach for
testing theories in medicine is the hypothetico-deductive
model as described by for example David Hume and Karl
Popper. According to this model it is impossible to
The Dent-O-Sept mouth swab Figure 1
The Dent-O-Sept mouth swab.Emerging Themes in Epidemiology 2008, 5:22 http://www.ete-online.com/content/5/1/22
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achieve absolute proof for a scientific hypothesis; tests
performed can only corroborate or falsify the hypothesis.
Consequently one can never prove causality between fac-
tors and an outcome, only strengthen or weaken a pro-
posed association. In this tradition Sir Austin Bradford
Hill listed nine viewpoints from which to study the asso-
ciation of two variables in order to claim causation [3].
Causation in epidemiology
Classic epidemiology has been mainly backward looking,
seeking an explanation to an event. In much of the 19th
century there was a profound debate on what caused
many of the major diseases of the time, being it miasmata
(stench or bad air) or contagions [18]. For a disease like
cholera John Snow, the father of epidemiology, was in
favour of the theory of a contagion which he called "mor-
bid matter" [19]. Late in the 19th century, a prominent
microbiologist, Robert Koch, formulated a set of postu-
lates that needed to be fulfilled in order to claim that a
micro-organism caused a specific disease [20,21]. Accord-
ing to his postulates we need both necessary and the suf-
ficient conditions to claim causal relationship between a
microbe and a disease.
A century later MacMahon stated that there are two ways
of classifying ill persons, either by manifestational criteria
(grouping ill persons according to symptoms or clinical
signs, e.g. common cold, schizophrenia or meningitis) or
by causal criteria (grouping ill persons with respect to a
specified experience believed to be a cause of their illness,
e.g. lead poisoning or meningococcal disease) [22]. To
have a Pseudomonas aeruginosa infection implies by name
and definition causality of the bacterium.
Causation in law
The Norwegian legal system belongs to the French-Ger-
man legal tradition which differs from the Anglo-Ameri-
can law in placing relatively more emphasis on statutory
law than the judiciary legal institutions in the making of
the legal framework. However, regarding tort law and cau-
sality the principles of the two legal systems are very sim-
ilar. Likewise, both legal systems have a lower threshold
for civil liability than criminal liability. There are several
examples from recent history in Norway where the
accused was found not guilty in the criminal court case
but was convicted to pay economic compensation in a fol-
lowing civil lawsuit.
Causal connection in law is usually divided into two parts,
"cause-in-fact" and "proximate cause" [16,23]. "Cause-in-
fact" comes closest to what is regarded as causality in sci-
ence. However, while science mostly deals with causal
generalisation, law focuses more on causes of specific
events. One standard method of establishing factual cau-
sation is the "but-for" test, aiming at excluding those fac-
tors that had no impact on the course of events. Another
influential test for causation is the NESS-test, i.e. Neces-
sary Element of a Sufficient Set test [23,24]. "Proximate
cause", also called "adequate cause", embodies reasons
for limiting the extent of legal responsibility and liability.
Additionally, deciding on legal responsibility and liability
involves a counterfactual proposition, i.e., if a condition
that in fact occurred had not occurred, then the outcome
would have been different. Both the "but-for" test and the
NESS test can be part of such counterfactual propositions.
The "but-for" test asks: Would the consequences have
occurred in these circumstances had the condition not
been present? The NESS test asks: In these circumstances,
is the condition a necessary member of a set of conditions
that are together sufficient to produce the consequence
[24]. Over-determination and joint determination are
weaknesses of the "but-for" test, whereas lack of determi-
nation challenges the NESS test [22].
Counterfactual theories of causation in sciences
The central question in counterfactual theories of causa-
tion is "What would have happened if not event c had
happened?" And the answer is: "If not event c had
occurred, then the event e would not have occurred" [25].
Counterfactual reasoning can be used both in determinis-
tic and probabilistic models. In daily life and in medicine
counterfactual reasoning is extensively used. "If the needle
hadn't been contaminated, the patient would not have
acquired hepatitis." "If you hadn't been exposed to asbes-
tos, you would not have contracted mesothelioma." Many
of the epidemiological study designs have counterfactual
thinking embodied [5]. In cohort studies we compare
exposed and unexposed individuals for a certain risk fac-
tor. The unexposed group can be viewed as "what if this
exposure did not occur". When calculating the attributa-
ble risk fraction, also called the etiological fraction, we
assume that all association between the exposure studied
and the outcome is causal, and in addition imply that if
not the exposed group had been exposed, the rate of out-
come among them would have been at the same level as
among the unexposed.
Necessary, sufficient and complex conditions (determinism)
Many conditions are necessary  for an event to occur.
Every time the event occurs, the condition is present. A
necessary condition for septicaemia is that one has blood;
however, we do not say that having blood is the cause of
sepsis. Owning the axe, which a person steals to kill a
man, does not make you a murderer, even though the axe
was a necessary condition for the man's death. This leads
to the claim that causation is not given by the necessary
conditions, although they are important, because if we
can eliminate the necessary conditions, we can eliminate
the problem.Emerging Themes in Epidemiology 2008, 5:22 http://www.ete-online.com/content/5/1/22
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Some conditions are sufficient to result in another: every
time they occur, something else happens. Drinking a cup
of hydrogen cyanide is a sufficient condition for death.
However, other conditions may also result in the effect;
not all deaths result from drinking hydrogen cyanide.
In complex situations many factors contribute to an effect,
and there are logistic problems in that an event occurs
some but not all times a constellation of factors occurs. To
overcome this, Mackie introduced the so-called INUS con-
dition of causation. An INUS condition for some effect is
an Insufficient but Non-redundant part of an Unnecessary
but Sufficient condition [26]. The NESS test described
above is a clarification or specific instance of an INUS con-
dition [23].
Determinism and probabilism
Causal determinism is based on the idea that that every
event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions
together with the laws of nature [27]. According to causal
determinism the causal relationships are invariant: Every
time a certain configuration of conditions occurs, the out-
come will be the same. We may have causal determinism
even if the situation is complex and the outcome is hard
to predict.
Probabilistic causality on the other hand claims that the
causal relationship is probabilistic, and not invariant.
That is, the outcome (effect) may vary according to prob-
ability distribution. Probabilistic theories of causation
state that causes raise the probabilities of their effects [9].
In epidemiology, probabilistic approaches are most often
used in the conceptual thinking of a relationship and in
the statistical testing of the strength of association [9].
Here, Hill's set of nine viewpoints to explain the associa-
tion between two variables are commonly used [3]. Only
the one of temporal sequence of association is essential.
This list of "Guidelines for causation" is more in tune with
modern epidemiological science as they emphasize the
strength of association rather than pure mechanical deter-
minism. However, many have criticised Hill's list and in
recent years there has been a resurge in the debate about
causality [6-8,10,28]. Moreover, probabilistic graphical
methods, such as Bayesian networks, may also be used in
order to represent the probabilistic independencies
between variables.
Causation in the Dent-O-Sept case
We have now presented theories for causation, which can
now be applied in a specific case, the Dent-O-Sept out-
break in Norway in 2002 [1,2].
Necessary and sufficient conditions
The P. aeruginosa bacterium is not a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for the death of people. Neither is its pres-
ence in the production plant a necessary and sufficient
condition for the presence of the bacteria in the product.
Hence, if necessary and sufficient conditions are required
for liability and moral responsibility, no one is responsi-
ble for the outbreak. Was the P. aeruginosa bacterium a
necessary condition?
For patients involved in the Dent-O-Sept outbreak, having
the outbreak strain of P. aeruginosa was necessary to be
included as a case. If it was not for the P. aeruginosa, then
there would have been no outbreak (i.e. "but-for"). But
this is more a definition criterion for being a case and does
not explain why the patient harboured this strain.
No single factor was absolutely required to be colonised
or infected with the outbreak strain. The use of Dent-O-
Sept was not a necessary condition for infection. Approx-
imately one third of the cases had not used the swab
directly. The outbreak investigators concluded that they
probably were secondarily infected from contaminated
environment or health care workers after the contami-
nated swabs had introduced the strain in the hospital
environment. By including this indirect pathway, it is rea-
sonable to claim that the contaminated swabs were a nec-
essary condition for the patients to become infected. This
is equivalent to outbreaks of gastroenteritis (e.g. salmo-
nellosis) where the primary cases may be infected by con-
taminated food, but cases continue to occur by person to
person transmission via the fecal-oral route even after the
implicated food item has been removed. In these situa-
tions, we would usually say that the food contamination
caused the whole outbreak, and not only the first cases.
P. aeruginosa is harmless to most people and in most
instances. The large majority of patients with the outbreak
strain of P. aeruginosa and all who died from the infection
had severe underlying illnesses. To have a severe underly-
ing illness was in practice a necessary condition to die
from the outbreak strain. So, both the presence of P. aeru-
ginosa in Dent-O-Sept and having an underlying illness
were necessary conditions for dying from the infection.
But there were other necessary conditions as well, such as
being hospitalised, but this we would hardly call a cause
of death. This illustrates the problem with necessary con-
ditions: there are extremely many of them.
In the Dent-O-Sept outbreak no single condition was suf-
ficient  to result in infection with the outbreak strain.
Given the large number of Dent-O-Sept swabs used in the
period and the massive contamination, we believe that
several thousand patients were exposed to the outbreak
strain of P. aeruginosa. Only a few of them became last-Emerging Themes in Epidemiology 2008, 5:22 http://www.ete-online.com/content/5/1/22
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ingly colonised or infected. Hence, the contaminated
Dent-O-Sept swab was not a sufficient condition for the
outbreak of the infection.
We may visualise a chain of unfortunate events necessary
for the outbreak to occur: The outbreak investigation dis-
cerned the direction of flow of the P. aeruginosa bacteria
from the production to the patients (figure 2). Can the
links of this chain be seen as a series of necessary condi-
tions that together are sufficient for the outbreak? How-
ever, the (necessary) conditions, such as the presence of P.
aeruginosa in the mouth swabs and the patients' suscepti-
bility, are not sufficient for the outbreak. There will not be
an outbreak every time these conditions occur. Applying
the concept of the INUS condition is helpful [26]. Using
contaminated swabs was in itself insufficient but non-
redundant, but together with other factors like the suscep-
tibility of the patients, the infectious dose, and underlying
illnesses, became sufficient to infect or colonise the
patient.
According to this approach to causality we can find the
altogether necessary and sufficient conditions for an
event. If we know the conditions (making up the cause),
the effect will occur. However, the challenge is that we do
not know all the conditions and their complex interplay.
For instance, we do not know the importance of the water
quality during production or the significance of the reuse
of the Dent-O-Sept for the outbreak.
Hill's postulates
In the Dent-O-Sept case, most of the points on Hill's list
are helpful in order to claim association, at least to a cer-
tain degree (table 1). In addition to the traditional epide-
miological measures of strength of association modern
microbiology has developed tools to demonstrate associ-
ations. Various techniques of producing "fingerprints" of
bacterial DNA have made it possible to identify identical
strains of bacteria. In outbreak investigations these tech-
niques have become very important to connect events and
claim causality, and are similar to detection of human
DNA in criminal investigations. When genotypically iden-
tical bacterial isolates were detected in the production
plant, in some of the swabs and in the affected patients,
we concluded that contamination of the production line
caused the outbreak.
Key actors
We will now in some more detail analyse key actors (table
2) and events in the light of causation and prepare for the
next section on moral responsibility.
The producer, Snøgg AS had a routine for cleaning and
disinfecting the production line but had no quality assur-
ance (QA) systems in place to control the production and
verifying that the product was safe. Having QA systems is
one of several requirements by Norwegian and EU law
[29] to be able to mark the product "CE" (Communauté
Européenne) which signifies that it complies with relevant
EU-regulations and indicates it being safe. Some years
prior to the outbreak, customers had periodically com-
plained about discoloured swabs. In 1999, the producer
commissioned an external evaluation and implemented
some, but not all the advice given; among the latter was
the advice to establish microbiological quality control of
the final product [17].
An audit of the producer revealed serious breaches of pro-
duction regulations [17]. Under strict liability, a party
breaking the law may be legally responsible irrespective of
whether any harm has been caused [24]. For instance,
driving under the influence of alcohol is in Norway as in
many other countries punishable by law even when no
one is harmed.
The presence of the outbreak strain in the production
facility was necessary for contamination to occur, but not
sufficient as not all swabs were contaminated. This dif-
fered even in swabs produced at the same time of day on
the same date. The main hypothesis of the outbreak inves-
The direction of flow of the Pseudomonas aeruginosa bacteria from the production to the patients Figure 2
The direction of flow of the Pseudomonas aeruginosa bacteria from the production to the patients.
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tigation team was that bacteria-containing biofilm was
randomly shed from the production equipment into the
swab wraps [2]. Using the judicial, counterfactual "but-
for" test: "But-for the absence of a microbiological quality
control of the production equipment and the final prod-
uct, would the contamination have been detected earlier
and the outbreak avoided?" There is good reason to
believe so. A total of 76 of 1565 swabs examined during
the outbreak investigation contained the outbreak strain
of P. aeruginosa, and more than 250 swabs (16%) con-
tained one or more microbes (including the outbreak
strain), also in swabs produced years before the Dent-O-
Sept outbreak started [2]. Consequently, not abiding by
the requirement to have QA systems including an effective
microbiological control system can be seen as a cause in
the legal sense for this outbreak to occur. The same goes if
we apply a counterfactual NESS test.
The P. aeruginosa bacterium was also detected in a rubber
hose leading from a water tap supplied with municipal
water to a large steel tank used in the production [2]. In a
press release the producer claimed that the municipal
water company caused the outbreak [30]. This claim of
the origin of the first bacterium could in retrospect not be
verified. However, there are no requirements for tap water
to be Pseudomonas or bacteria free. On the contrary, it is
common microbiological knowledge that P. aeruginosa at
times can be detected in water and soil [31,32]. The bacte-
ria could have originated from other sources and contam-
inated the rubber hose. Using the "but-for" test on the
water supply fails to show it to be a cause-in-fact due to
the uncertainty of the origin of the first bacteria. Likewise,
due to the uncertainty of the origin it fails a counterfactual
NESS test. Hence, bacteria in the tap water cannot be seen
as a legal cause of the outbreak.
Many of the hospitals had several deficiencies in their QA
systems, for instance concerning the selection of which
products to purchase; the actual procurement of the prod-
uct; the logistic system for reception, distribution, storage,
and use of the product [33]. Many of these deficiencies are
in breach of national guidelines and legal regulations but
did probably not have any influence on this particular
outbreak. The bacterial load inside the wrap probably
diminished over time as the bacteria cannot survive with-
out oxygen. Consequently, the deficient logistics systems
in the hospitals appear not to be a cause-in-fact of this
outbreak. However, competent procurers in hospitals
might have detected inferior products or the lack of docu-
mentation, such as the declaration of conformity which is
required for all CE marked medical devices with the EU
directive [29].
Table 1: Application of Hill's viewpoints on the causal association between the Dent-O-Sept swab and becoming colonised or infected 
during the outbreak
Hill's viewpoints Application on the Dent-O-Sept outbreak
1. Strength of association Strong.
Association for having used the swab during hospitalisation and having the outbreak strain of P. aeruginosa, 
adjusted odds ratio 5.3.
Detecting genotypically identical strains of the bacterium in patients, the product and in the production 
facility [1]
2. Consistency of association Yes, to a large extent.
However, other co-factors also needed to be in place, e.g. contamination of the particular swab and a 
susceptible patient. Due to secondary spread in the hospitals also patients who did not use the swab were 
infected.
3. Specificity of association Yes, mostly.
Use of contaminated swabs led to colonisation and some times to infection. Necessary co-factors were as 
above (2). The clinical manifestations of the P. aeruginosa infection varied widely.
4. Temporal sequence of association Yes.
However, the outbreak strain of the bacteria was found in six patients before the production of the first 
contaminated batch of swabs was detected [2].
When the swabs were withdrawn from the marked the number of cases gradually diminished and 
disappeared.
5. Biological gradient This was not tested but assumed. Reuse of the swabs may have increased the bacterial load and hence the 
risk of becoming infected.
6. Plausibility of association Yes.
The chain from contamination during production to infection is well described.
7. Coherence of association Yes.
There is no other hypothesis of explanations for the outbreak.
8. Experiment (reversibility) Yes, a natural experiment.
When the source was removed the number of cases gradually diminished to zero.
9. Analogy Yes.
There are many other outbreaks caused by medical devices. (References in [1])Emerging Themes in Epidemiology 2008, 5:22 http://www.ete-online.com/content/5/1/22
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Health care workers (HCWs) are constantly told to be
economical and prudent in the use of medical equipment.
In many hospitals it was customary to reuse the swab in
the same patient although it was clearly marked as single
use equipment. In between cleaning the patient's mouth
the swab was sometimes stored in a glass of water on the
patient's night stand. This practice allowed rapid multipli-
cation of bacteria on the swab. This unprescribed use did
not introduce the bacteria in swabs and hence in patients
where it had not already been, but probably increased the
bacterial load. An increase in bacterial load increases the
risk of infecting a contaminated patient and of causing a
more serious disease. "But-for" the improper use of the
swab, the same number of patients would be exposed to
the P. aeruginosa bacteria, but probably fewer would have
been colonised and probably fewer colonised patients
would have contracted serious infections. Together with
the introduction of the outbreak strain into the hospitals
and the susceptibility of the patients, the reuse of the
swabs can be seen as a necessary (non-redundant) condi-
tion or as a counterfactual conditional. Moreover, the
improper use of the swab may fail a but-for-test (due to
joint determination), but not a NESS-test. Hence, it is not
clear that HCWs behavior caused the outbreak in a legal
sense.
Hospital reporting systems for faulty medical equipment
are not the same for all types of equipment. A general atti-
tude among HCWs is that reporting is fruitless and not
really necessary, especially for minor products like mouth
swabs. During the investigation we learnt that several
HCWs had detected discoloured or otherwise faulty swabs
without reporting the event. It is worth noting that the
notification of faulty swabs by an infection control nurse
contributed to solving the outbreak quicker.
Table 2: The main participants in the Dent-O-Sept outbreak and some of their roles, responsibilities and actions.
Participant Role and responsibilities
The producer
"Snøgg AS"
• Produced the Dent-O-Sept swab
• Did not adhere to the laws and regulations for production of medical devices
• Lacked a quality assurance system for the production
• Did not implement advise after external evaluation
• Stopped the swab production as soon as the connection with the outbreak was 
established
The water supplier
"Kristiansand municipality"
• Supplied drinking water to the producer
• The P. aeruginosa bacterium may have been introduced into the production plant 
with the water
The hospitals • Treated patients and procured medical devices
• Many lacked quality assured systems for procurement, storage and use of medical 
devices
• Many lacked systems for training of health care workers
• Many had inadequate reporting systems for faulty medical devices
The health care workers • Treated and cared for patients
• Many reused the "single use" swabs contrary to the text on the wrap
• Many did not report faulty medical devices
The patients • Received medical treatment and care
• Many were seriously ill and susceptible for contracting infections with the P. 
aeruginosa bacterium
The surveyor and investigator
"Norwegian Institute of Public Health"
• Responsible for surveillance of infectious diseases and for outbreak investigations
• There is no national surveillance system for P. aeruginosa infections
National administrative body
"The Norwegian Directorate for Health and Social Affairs"
• Responsible for national administration within certain areas of the health care 
system
• Responsible for the audit of the producer
• Ignored the deadline to appeal the police's decision not to press charges.Emerging Themes in Epidemiology 2008, 5:22 http://www.ete-online.com/content/5/1/22
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"But-for" the lack of reporting it is impossible to ascertain
whether the outbreak would have been detected earlier as
it depends on many other factors like what was reported,
how it was reported in the system and what measures
where taken following a report. In a probabilistic or risk
assessment approach, low threshold reporting systems
with appropriate follow-up routines and adequate surveil-
lance systems, make it more likely that the contaminated
swabs and the outbreak would have been detected earlier
(counterfactual).
Surveillance systems are in place for many infectious dis-
eases, but not for Pseudomonas infections [34]. Only the
most prevalent or serious diseases are included into the
surveillance systems after weighing factors such as costs
and preventability. When the computer systems improve,
more infections can be included at no or little extra cost.
As concluded in the previous paragraph, had an adequate
surveillance system for the P. aeruginosa bacterium or
some of the infections it caused been in place, it is more
likely that the outbreak could have been detected earlier.
However, the main importance of reporting systems for
faulty equipment and surveillance systems is that of pre-
paredness. Had the swabs not been contaminated, imper-
fect reporting and surveillance systems do not add to the
risk of causing outbreaks like unclean production of med-
ical equipment does (counterfactual).
The outbreak investigation was a necessary condition to
stop the outbreak. Could the number of patients affected
have been smaller if the investigation had been carried out
differently? During the investigation there was a tremen-
dous pressure to find the solution quickly. A rushed inves-
tigation might have resulted in not detecting the cause or
getting the results wrong, whereas a broad, systematic
investigation might have taken too long causing unneces-
sary sufferings and deaths. As two of the authors of this
article (BGI and PA) were responsible for the outbreak
investigation [1,2] we are not competent to appraise the
investigation.
In conclusion, many factors contributed to the outbreak
and its eventual dimension. The main necessary condition
for the outbreak was the contamination of the swabs in
the production facility. The size of the outbreak measured
in the number of patients affected and how long it lasted
are due to several additional factors. The breaches of reg-
ulations by the producer of the swabs play an important
role probably together with the reuse of the swabs in the
hospital, i.e. they are conditions that are influencing the
size of the outbreak. With a regulatory correct production
of the swabs in the production facilities there would have
been no outbreak (necessary condition). The reuse of the
swabs in the hospitals and the non-optimal production
probably increased the size of the outbreak (probabilistic
factor). In addition, other factors that might have an influ-
ence are the lack of adequate reporting and surveillance
systems.
Moral responsibility
Many people suffered in the outbreak. Seventy-one people
with the outbreak strain died while hospitalised, and for
at least 34 the investigators concluded that the P. aerugi-
nosa infection probably contributed to the death. No one
was found criminally liable. Several actors were in a posi-
tion where they could have known and acted differently,
and hence, are to be seen as morally responsible. In the
discussion on causes for the outbreak two main actors
emerged in the discussion on responsibility. One is the
producer Snøgg AS. The other is the group of HCWs who
reused the swabs and the hospital system permitting these
acts or possibly even encouraging them. What is their
moral responsibility?
Traditionally, medical errors have been divided into three:
Unintentional error, intentional error and random mis-
haps. In addition, bad outcomes may happen without
error [35]. For our discussion we will only focus on unin-
tentional error as no one in this outbreak ever was sus-
pected of intentionally wanting to cause harm.
Unintentional error can be caused by lack of knowledge,
lack of skill or non-application of relevant knowledge or
skill.
The producer Snøgg produces a wide range of medical
equipment useful for saving lives and reducing suffering.
The Dent-O-Sept swab had been produced for decades
and was in great demand. Their vision statement is "gjøre
det enkelt å hjelpe" [Make it simple to help] http://
www.snogg.no. In all their appearances the producer gave
no impression of intending to harm anyone, and from a
virtue-ethical standpoint, the company appeared favoura-
bly (see endnote 1). When the connection between the
swab and the outbreak was detected, the director of Snøgg
was devastated for what his product had caused [36,37].
Some months later the company started to focus more on
other factors influencing the outbreak. One of their new
initiatives was to partly blame the outbreak on the intro-
duction of the P. aeruginosa bacterium into the production
facilities through the municipal water pipe [30]. Another
was to draw the attention to the incorrect use of the swabs
in hospitals [38]. The company is expected to know that
they needed to have systems in place to stop bacteria in
municipal tap water from reaching the end product.
The impetus not to harm patients ("Primum non nocere"
– "First do no harm" ascribed to Hippocrates) and to care
for the vulnerable are duties with strong deontologic bear-
ings (see endnote 2). The duty to acquire necessary knowl-
edge for the safe performance of health care services, asEmerging Themes in Epidemiology 2008, 5:22 http://www.ete-online.com/content/5/1/22
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well as being precautious appear to be part of such a per-
spective. Hence, the actions of the producer (as well as the
health care professionals) appear to breach with basic
deontological bearings in health care. Moreover, if the
moral norms of the producer's responsibilities are ade-
quately regulated by law, breaking these legal regulations,
such as the Act on medical devices [39], would in most
cases be a breach with the moral duties of a producer.
The Dent-O-Sept mouth swab belongs to Medical device
Class 1, which includes most non-invasive medical
devices according to the European Council Directive 93/
42/EEC [29]. The directive states that the devices must,
when used, "not compromise the clinical condition or the
safety of patients". "The devices and manufacturing proc-
esses must be designed in such a way as to eliminate or
reduce as far as possible the risk of infection to the patient,
user and third parties." Accordingly, the Council Directive
represents a consequentialist approach (see endnote 3).
The producer did not abide by the laws and regulations
relevant to him, and thus ignoring relevant norms and rel-
evant consequences.
The unintended error of producing contaminated swabs
appears only to a small extent to result from lack of
knowledge. The producer knew there had been problems
in the production and had received advice on implement-
ing QA systems which the producer had not followed in
great detail. By not doing so there appears to be a non-
application of relevant knowledge which would normally
be characterized as negligent and culpable. However,
there probably was a lack of knowledge about how bacte-
ria can contaminate the production equipment. The Dent-
O-Sept swab was the only moist item Snøgg produced.
Had the microbiological quality control measures been
implemented, this would probably have been revealed
and harm could have been avoided. In addition, there
probably also was some lack of skill in cleaning and dis-
infecting the wet part of production.
Hence, the outbreak was not a result of wilful or inten-
tional error. However, the non-adherence to norms and
regulations and the non-application or non-acquisition of
knowledge can be conceived of as malpractice. It is not the
case that science has not yet progressed enough, or that
there are limitations in the predictive nature of knowledge
with regards to the particular case [35].
The health care workers aim at saving lives and alleviate
pain and suffering. Their work is legally regulated by laws
and regulations, and professionally by guidelines, instruc-
tions and training. In addition, their actions are also to a
large degree guided by colleagues and the culture of the
workplace. One of the traditional Norwegian virtues of is
that of austerity. It can partly be ascribed to the nation's
economic poverty up until a few decades ago and to our
Lutheran tradition of modesty ("In the sweat of thy face
shalt thou eat bread", Genesis 3:19). This demand of
being economical is also reflected in the Act on health per-
sonnel [40] and in instructions from the hospital manage-
ment. Single use products are in conflict with being
economical. In several hospitals it was accepted or even
encouraged to reuse the swabs, possibly considering them
to be a variant of the tooth-brush. There is also a conse-
quentialist reasoning for this austerity: reduced cost com-
bined with low risk.
The Norwegian and English texts on the wrap were quite
different, and the Norwegian being the most ambiguous:
"Antiseptisk engangspensel for munnhygiene" which lit-
erarily translates to "Antiseptic one-time-swab for mouth
hygiene"; whereas the English text read: "Premoistened
foam swab for mouth hygiene". Although "engangs" usu-
ally is translated to "single use" some can also understand
it to be "single period-use" just like a single use syringe
can be used for multiple injections in the same patient
within a short time frame. To avoid possible misinterpre-
tations a resent amendment (05.09.2007) to the Euro-
pean Council Directive on Medical devices has defined a
"single use device" as "a device intended to be used once
only for a single patient". The claim of antiseptic proper-
ties of the swab (which was never documented by the pro-
ducers [17]) may have led some health care workers to
underestimate the risk this practise posed. Placing a swab
coated with an oral cavity bacterial flora in a glass of water
with saliva and mucus as nutrition, may lead to extensive
bacterial growth up to a concentration which makes it
potentially harmful. And no one could presume that the
swabs contained P. aeruginosa. In addition, there is an
active debate within the medical community in Europe
whether it can be safe to reuse reprocessed single use med-
ical equipment.
There were no guidelines against this practice and no
superiors contradicted it. From a virtue-ethical perspective
the act was ambiguous; it was austere, but against profes-
sional standards (of following written instructions) and
the duty to care for the patient. The main reason for the
medical error of reusing the swab was non-application or
misunderstanding of relevant information.
According to Norwegian law, hospital management shall
provide for making an infection control programme, pro-
ducing guidelines to prevent hospital acquired infections,
having a system for surveillance of infectious diseases and
for procurement and control of medical equipment. As
there were deficiencies in many of these fields in many
hospitals, the hospital management consequently appears
to be morally negligent and legally responsible according
to the NESS-test. When human error repetitively occursEmerging Themes in Epidemiology 2008, 5:22 http://www.ete-online.com/content/5/1/22
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within a system it is of interest to discuss whether to have
a person approach or a system approach. If preventing
future errors is the aim, a system approach appears to be
more rewarding [41]. However, even though responsibil-
ity of the management does not free the individual
employees from responsibility, it would be fruitless to try
to identify individual health care workers reusing the
swab and place them under moral and legal scrutiny.
After the Dent-O-Sept swab was withdrawn from the mar-
ket, other similar products have taken its place. Despite all
the media attention from this outbreak, we have received
anecdotal information that health care workers still reuse
single use mouth swabs.
Legal consequences
At least 231 patients contracted the bacterium and for at
least 34 patients the investigators concluded that the P.
aeruginosa infection probably contributed to the patient's
death. There was much anxiety and guilt feeling among
patients and relatives. Many had cared for their terminally
ill relatives and used the Dent-O-Sept swab. Some called
the Norwegian Institute of Public Health and asked for
example: "Did I kill my mother by using the swab?"
No one was made criminally liable after this outbreak.
The police started an investigation of the producer but
decided not to press charges. The Norwegian Directorate
for Health and Social Affairs appealed the decision several
months after the time limit for appeal had expired; hence
the Attorney-General could not reopen the case [42,43].
Norsk pasientskadeerstatning (NPE, the Norwegian Sys-
tem of Compensation to Patients) grants monetary com-
pensation mainly for economical loss and to some degree
for permanent disablement due to injury inflicted as a
result of treatment in public health services in Norway
[44,45]. Few patients could document economical loss
because they were, among other things, elderly, disabled,
not working, had severe chronic diseases or were already
severely injured e.g. after serious car accidents.
By 18 February 2004, NPE had received a total of 287
claims. Of 256 claims processed 48 were accepted for
compensation and 2.3 million NOK (≈ 290 000 EUR) had
been awarded [46]. By June 2007 the total number of
processed claims was 291 of 292. NPE sent a claim for re-
compensation to the producer. In an out-of court settle-
ment dated 11 October 2005 the producer agreed to pay
NPE 1.2 million NOK (≈ 150 000 EUR) as a full and final
sum of any regress demand in connection with the mouth
swabs and without accepting responsibility for the out-
break (Deputy Director General R. G. Jørstad, NPE, per-
sonal communication).
In addition to the claim from NPE other civil claims were
made against the producer. One large hospital reached a
court settlement on 19 June 2006 with the producer and
received compensation amounting to 3.3 million NOK (≈
410 000 EUR) for additional costs incurred for prolonged
hospitalisations of patients and for preventing further
spread of the bacterium [47]. There may be other settle-
ments that not have been made public. Hence the total
known compensations paid by the producer amounts to
4.5 million NOK (≈ 560 000 EUR).
In jurisprudence responsibility is related to causality. To
be negligent in most instances requires to have caused the
harm. In this article we have argued that the contamina-
tion of the Dent-O-Sept swab was a necessary (non-redun-
dant) condition for colonising and infecting the
individual patients and by this "caused" the outbreak.
Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that if sys-
tematic microbiological sampling of the product as part of
a QA system had been in place, microbial contamination
of the product would have been detected. That is, accord-
ing to counterfactual probabilistic reasoning, the
neglected QA system "caused" the outbreak. This claim
uses both deterministic arguments (swab causes out-
break) and probabilistic reasoning (the probability that a
microbiological QA system will detect the contamina-
tion). In addition many other factors contributed to the
number of patients being affected (the extent of the out-
break), like the susceptibility of each individual patient
being exposed, the reuse of the swab by HCWs and the
hospital attitude for accepting reuse of swabs, to name a
few. Several of these factors can be interpreted as INUS
conditions and also play a role in applying Hill's nine
viewpoints in claiming a causal association between the
swab and Pseudomonas infection (table 1). The case also
illustrates the weaknesses of the "but-for" test (with
regards to assessment of cause-in-fact) as there were many
concurrent factors that cannot be differentiated as neces-
sary for the event, they were only necessary elements
(NESS-test).
After establishing a cause-in-fact relationship, the proxim-
ity or adequacy of causes needs to be discussed. Whereas
the contamination of the swabs during production
appears to be an adequate cause, the possibility of the ori-
gin of the first bacterium through the municipal water
supply is not because it is neither illegal nor verified. In
addition, it precedes a "novus actus" which is the breech of
regulations in the production. It can be argued that the
reuse of the swabs in the hospitals is also proximate, at
least for some of the patients becoming infected during
the outbreak. Whether the individual HCW or the hospi-
tal system is responsible is open for debate [41].Emerging Themes in Epidemiology 2008, 5:22 http://www.ete-online.com/content/5/1/22
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Why was no one criminally charged in this outbreak? We
have argued for a causal association between the contam-
inated swabs and Pseudomonas infection and death, and a
breech of regulations during production has been estab-
lished. However, the error was unintentional and due to a
non-application of relevant knowledge and skill; a knowl-
edge that isn't intuitively evident to everyone. The police
decided not to press charges. In a press release, the police
pointed at other circumstances, arguing that the health
authorities had not audited the producer prior to the out-
break, and that there were irregularities in the use of the
swabs in the hospitals and in the reporting of faulty med-
ical devices. In addition, the fact that the Directorate for
Health and Social Affairs did not appeal the decision until
too late blocked the possibility for a reinvestigation of the
case due to the procedures described in the Criminal Pro-
cedure Act.
Conclusion
The major necessary condition causing the outbreak was
the contamination of the swabs in the production facility.
Without this contamination, the Dent-O-Sept outbreak
would not have happened. Hence, there exists a cause-in-
fact according to the but-for-test. Many other factors con-
tributed to the outbreak and the size of it, the reuse of the
single use swabs being the most important. The unin-
tended error – by the producer of the swabs and to a
minor extent by the hospital practice – was mainly due to
non-application of relevant knowledge and skills, and
breaches with moral duties as professionals, constituting
moral negligence.
In epidemiology, other sciences, philosophy and jurispru-
dence there are plenty of methods and theories to explain
causality and responsibility in complex situations like
outbreak investigations. Applying different theories from
different disciplines on the various necessary and suffi-
cient conditions and the roles and responsibilities of the
participants, is useful and important to elucidate the com-
plex from most angles. From an outbreak investigator's
viewpoint no theory is the only correct one. Using
Mackie's concept of INUS conditions and Hill's nine view-
points of claiming a causal association, applying deter-
ministic as well as probabilistic ways of reasoning, all
shed light on the issues of causality in this outbreak. Med-
ical practice and jurisprudence is closely connected in real
life as professional negligence can have legal conse-
quences. Cases in epidemiology, such as outbreak investi-
gation, highlight the tension both in science and
jurisprudence between general causality and the causality
of specific events. Moreover, applying legal theories of
causation (counterfactual reasoning and the "but-for" test
or the NESS test) proved important perspectives on the
Dent-O-Sept outbreak.
As shown for the outbreak of P. aeruginosa infection the
issue of causality also serves as a starting point for the
debate on legal responsibility. Due to criminal procedure
laws and other factors outside the discourse of causality,
no one was criminally charged for the outbreak.
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Endnotes
Endnote 1
Virtue ethics is a branch of moral philosophy that empha-
sizes character as the key element of ethical thinking,
rather than rules or consequences.
Endnote 2
Deontological ethics, deontology or duty-based-ethics is
an approach to ethics that focuses on the rightness or
wrongness of actions themselves, as opposed to the right-
ness or wrongness of the consequences of those actions.
The term deontology stems from Greek: deon (δον) which
means obligation or duty.
Endnote 3
Consequentialism refers to those moral theories which
hold that the basis for any valid moral judgment about an
action is the consequences of the particular action.
Accordingly a morally right action is an action that pro-
duces good consequences.
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